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Resumen: Durante la Segunda República Libanesa (1943-1975) existía la 
percepción de que la comunidad maronita era la secta dominante del país y 
ostentaba un papel casi hegemónico dentro del marco confesional del Estado. 
Mediante el análisis de tres acontecimientos históricos clave (la “Revolución 
del Agua de Rosas” de 1952, la crisis de 1958 y las elecciones presidenciales 
de 1970), este ensayo tratará de probar que la comunidad maronita no ostentaba 
un control desproporcionado sobre la política libanesa y que el sectarianismo 
no era el factor predominante y definitorio de su sistema político, sino uno más 
entre otros lazos tradicionales, cuya influencia era aún mayor. 
 
Abstract: During the Second Lebanese Republic (1943-1975), the Maronite 
Community was perceived as the country’s leading sect, holding an almost 
hegemonic role within the state’s confessional framework. By analyzing three 
key historical events (the 1952 “Rosewater Revolution”, the 1958 Crisis and 
the 1970 presidential elections), this essay will try to prove that neither the 
Maronite Community held a disproportionate control over Lebanon’s politics, 
nor sectarianism was the predominant factor defining its political system, but 
one among other traditional ties, whose influence was even bigger. 
 
Palabras clave: Maronitas. Sectarismo. Confesionalismo. Tradicionalismo. 
 
Key words: Maronites. Sectarianism. Confessionalism. Traditionalism. 
 
Borja W. González Fernández 
 
64 
A Rose among thorns, an impregnable rock in the sea, 
unshaken by the waves and fury of the thundering tempest 
Pope Leo X, on the Maronites 
 
ىقبنو 
And we stay 
(Written on the walls of Beirut, 1982) 
 
 
Introduction

 
 
Between 1988 and 1990, the Lebanese Army, under the command of 
General Michel ‘Aūn, and the strongest of the remaining Christian militias, 
the Lebanese Forces (al-quwwāt al-lubnāniyyah), fought a highly 
destructive, fratricide, intra-Christian war which brought the Civil War 
(1975-1990) to an end, ruining any chance of organized resistance against 
the Syrian invasion. However sad this episode might be, at least it gave a 
true picture of the internal divisions affecting all Lebanese communities, in 
spite of the Western press’ tiresome – even misleading – insistence in 
presenting the conflict as a Muslim-Christian war, a kind of ‘clash of 
civilizations’ produced long before Huntington wrote his famous book. 
This insistence, both journalistic and academic, on the confessional 
aspect of the Civil War is but a logic consequence of the peculiar structure 
of the Lebanese political system, where public office is distributed 
following a strict sectarian apportionment, which allows only certain 
 
                                                 
  The original version of this article will be published by the Universidad Autónoma de 
Madrid in its collection of MA theses. Special thanks are due to María Isabel Fierro 
Bello (CCHS-CSIC) for her inestimable help throughout the process of writing it, and 
Fiona McCallum (University of St. Andrews) for her kind remarks and improvement 
suggestions. The transcription of personal and place names follows the rules of IJMES. 
Those place names having an English translation appear in their translated form (thus, 
Beirut and not Bayrūt). Names of authors are displayed as they appear in their books or 
articles. 
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communities to occupy certain positions; therefore, the President is always 
a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the 
National Assembly, a Shiite and so forth. The Legislative Chamber itself 
was – and still is – confessionally structured, following a 6:5 proportion 
favourable to Christians before 1990 and now, divided by half for each 
religion. The origins of this system are widely known to hark back to the 
disturbances which ravaged the Mountain in the 19
th
 century, with the 
principle of confessional representation being firstly enshrined in the 
institution of the double Qā’imaqāmiyyah, the Northern one being put 
under a Maronite chief, the Southern one, under a Druze. Thereafter, all 
institutional arrangements in the area currently known as Lebanon have 
followed this line, including the Mutaṣarrifiyyah (1861-1916), the French 
Mandate (1920-1943) and the independent Lebanese Republic. 
The rationale behind this sectarian organization, enshrined later on in 
the so-called National Pact, obeys, in the words of Michel Chiha, father of 
the 1926 Lebanese Constitution and national conscience of the Second 
Republic (1943-1975), to the fact that Lebanon is «a country of associated 
confessional minorities»
1
, which need to find, in the Chamber and the 
institutions, the necessary balance between them in order to «gather in the 
Lebanese community all the Lebanese communities»
2
. In a country so 
divided as Lebanon, «the profound tranquility which results from an 
equitable policy forbidding all kinds of violence against the minority, 
whichever it is»
3
 can only be achieved, in the opinion of Chiha, by 
guaranteeing all confessional groups a parliamentary watchtower for the 
defense of their rights. 
And despite widespread criticism, the system managed to control inter-
sectarian conflict for over three decades
4
. However, with so much scholarly 
 
                                                 
1  Michel CHIHA, Politique Intérieure (Beirut: Éditions du Trident, 1964), p. 54. 
2  M. CHIHA, Politique, p. 97. Emphasis in the original. 
3  M. CHIHA, Politique, p. 97. 
4  Michael HUDSON, The Precarious Republic Revisited: Reflections on the Collapse of 
Pluralist Politics in Lebanon (Washington D.C.: Institute of Arab Development, Center 
for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1977), p. 6. 
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emphasis directed at the external characteristics of the Lebanese political 
structure, the intra-sectarian aspect has been sorely forgotten, in spite of the 
recognition, by just a few authors
5
, of the importance of other loyalties 
beyond confessional belonging, like kinship or fealty, which in the case of 
the former was even considered «Lebanon’s most solid and enduring tie»6, 
way ahead of confessional belonging. In the same spirit, Albert Hourani 
recognized that «[confessional] communities are not [...] solid bodies 
having a single interest or attitude, and [this] division [...] is not the only 
[...] which can be made of the population of Lebanon, and in some ways 
may not be the most significant.»
7
, therefore there is a felt need to study the 
inner working of the different Lebanese communities, in order to fully 
grasp the historical processes which took place in that country since it 
became an independent state. 
Our essay will try to tackle this need making a contribution to the 
growing body of literature maintaining that confessionalism is not the 
dominant factor in Lebanese politics and, to do so, our attention will be 
focused on the Maronite community. An ethno-religious group
8
 whose role 
during the First Republic has been variably described as preponderant
9
, 
dominant
10
, privileged
11
 and even hegemonic
12
, which makes the unders-
 
                                                 
5  Let us mention Arnold Hottinger, Samir Khalaf and Albert Hourani. 
6  Samir KHALAF, “Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon”, Middle Eastern Studies 4 
(1968), p. 246. 
7  Albert HOURANI, “Ideologies of the Mountain and the City”, in Roger OWEN (ed.), 
Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), p. 34. 
8  John P. ENTELIS, “Belief-system and ideology formation in the Lebanese Katā’ib Party”, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (1973), p. 148. 
9  Boutros LABAKI, “Les chrétiens du Liban (1943-2008). Prépondérance, marginalisation 
et renouveau”, Confluences Méditerranée 66 (2008), p. 106 
10  Marie-Christine AULAS, “The socio-ideological development of the Maronite 
Community: the emergence of the Phalanges and the Lebanese Forces”, Arab Studies 
Quarterly 7 (1985), p. 14. 
11  M. HUDSON, Precarious, p. 8; Fawwaz TRABOULSI, A History of Modern Lebanon, 
(London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007), p. 110. 
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tanding of its internal dynamics a must to realize why the only Arab Middle 
East’s experiment at political and economic liberalism crashed in such a 
dramatic way as a 15-year-long civil war. This study will also provide us 
with the opportunity to demonstrate the radical falsehood of the 
aforementioned adjectives, and to prove that there was no Maronite 
dominance or hegemony in Lebanese politics in the Republic of 
Independence, but «a full partnership between the various Christian and 
Moslem sects in which no one sect alone could determine policy»
13
. 
To achieve our goals, this essay is divided in three clearly differentiated 
parts. Apart from a thorough review of the available literature on Maronite 
History and Lebanese politics, we will examine Maronite politics in three 
periods: the Crises of 1952 and 1958 and the Legislative Election of 1970. 
In so doing, our attention will be focused in vital moments for Lebanon, 
emphasizing the inner working of the community, which will provide us 
with more information about it than a mere overview of Lebanese History 
during the studied period. After this second part, of an essentially 
descriptive nature, the third and last part of this essay will analyze the 
historical facts to give appropriate answers to the proposed questions. 
 
 
1. Literature review 
 
It is almost a tradition in Middle East scholarship to begin any essay on 
Lebanon by stating that primordial ties dominate that country’s politics. 
The widely accepted importance of sect, kin, fealty and family in the 
development of political life in the country of the Cedar overwhelms the 
literature, and this paper does not pretend to break away from this tradition, 
but to question the assumption that many authors make about the 
predominance of the sectarian factor over other considerations (Michael 
                                                                                                                 
12  Eyal ZISSER, “The Maronites, Lebanon and the State of Israel: Early Contacts”, Middle 
Eastern Studies 31 (1995), p. 889. 
13  Kamal S. SALIBI, The Modern History of Lebanon (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1965), 
p. 188. 
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Hudson, Fawwaz Traboulsi, Camille Habib, Jihad Nammour). Curiously, 
most of these “anti-confessional” scholars have also the tendency to 
underline what they label as Christian dominance over Lebanese politics, 
that is the case, for instance, of Fawwaz Traboulsi, who goes as far as to 
affirm that «sectarian pluralism barely concealed Maronite political 
primacy»
14
. 
For most of the mentioned authors, confessionalism in particular, and 
the survival in general, of these traditional ties prevented the modernization 
of the Lebanese political system, this being the opinion of Michael Hudson, 
for whom «the proportional representation solution for sectarian tensions 
aggravated other problems because of the policy immobilism that it 
engendered [preventing] the Lebanese state to modernize itself»
15
, whereas 
Camille Habib thinks that «[c]onsociation is a system that contradicts the 
rules of Western democracy [and] defies the modern spirit of individual 
endeavour and social change»
16
. In his opinion, the «confessional political 
system breeds nothing but crises»
17
. Even some of the authors recognizing 
the prominent role played by other traditional ties, alongside 
confessionalism, in the political life of Lebanon, characterize their persi-
stence as having negative consequences, Nizar Hamzeh, for example, 
considers that the former have had «a constraining effect on the enactment 
of universalistic policies and [have] discouraged the development of citizen 
participation»
18
. 
However, as has already been mentioned, we will maintain throughout 
this study – together with authors the like of Farid el-Khazen, Samir 
Khalaf, Caroline E.A. Knight or Oren Barak, that confessionalism was 
neither the foremost factor conditioning Lebanese life during the Second 
 
                                                 
14  F. TRABOULSI, Modern Lebanon, p. 109. 
15  M. HUDSON, Precarious, p. 6. 
16  Camille HABIB, “Lebanese Politics and the Tyranny of Confessionalism”, Confluences 
Méditerranée 70 (2009), p. 65. 
17  C. HABIB, “Tyranny”, p. 64. 
18  Nizar A. HAMZEH, “Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends”, Middle Eastern Studies 
37 (2001), p. 167. 
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Republic nor a factor preventing its political modernization because, as 
Samir Khalaf states, «political modernization and the persistence of 
traditions need not be incompatible»
19
. Moreover, we fully coincide with 
Caroline E. A. Knight, when she says that «confessionalism has been used 
as a scapegoat for many problems whose true roots lie somewhere»
20
. 
In order to do so, our attention will be concentrated on the evolution of 
the Maronite community, trying to prove that this tā’ifah did not hold a 
hegemonic domination over Lebanon during the period under study, being 
instead participant in a consociational arrangement that «functioned 
relatively well [until] it was subjected to [...] externally-generated 
pressure»
21
. By putting the focus over this community, we are also trying to 
pay our modest contribution to a sector of scholarship which has been, until 
now, utterly neglected: that of Maronite History in independent Lebanon. It 
is truly surprising that, leaving aside a couple of PhD or MPhil thesis
22
 and 
the not very scientific The Maronites in History by Matti Moosa (who uses 
more than half of the book to attack what he considers as the weak points 
of Maronite doctrine), almost no author has dealt in depth with the 
contemporary history of the Middle East’s only Christian compact 
minority. This neglect contrasts vividly with the interest that the medieval 
and modern History of the Maronites has aroused in the scholar 
community, with such examples as the encyclopaedic Histoire des 
Maronites by Mgr. Boutros Dib, or Kamal Salibi’s Maronite Historians of 
Mediaeval Lebanon, not to mention hundreds of academic articles 
 
                                                 
19  S. KHALAF, “Primordial”, p. 245. 
20  Caroline E. A. KNIGHT, “Traditional Influences upon Lebanese Politics”, The Journal of 
Social, Political and Economic Studies 17 (1992), p. 341. 
21  Farid EL-KHAZEN, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976 (London–New 
York: I.B. Tauris in association with The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p. 32. 
22  Ferdinand DREXLER, Geschichte der Maroniten des Libanon unter politischem 
Blickpunkt mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der modernen Forschung (Vienna: 
Universität Wien, 2012) and Noël W. SPENCER, The role of the Maronite Patriarchate in 
Lebanese Politics from 1840 to the Present (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 
1963). 
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published in dozens of journals, first and foremost among them Parole 
d’Orient, the Arab Christian and Syriac Studies journal of the Maronite 
Université du Saint-Esprit de Kaslik (USEK). 
To achieve our goals, attention will be given first to the historical 
evolution of the Lebanese State between its independence and the outbreak 
of the Civil war, by centering on three fundamental events: the 1952 
“Rosewater Revolution”, the 1958 Crisis and the 1970 presidential 
elections, which will be followed by an analysis where the hypothesis 
presented in this section will be confirmed. 
 
 
2. Historicak study 
 
2.1. Bishārah al-Khūrī and the 1952 Crisis 
 
On September 21
st
 1943, Bishārah al-Khūrī was elected President of the 
Lebanese Republic, receiving the overwhelming support of the National 
Assembly, with 44 votes in his favour and three abstentions
23
. His 
ascension to the First Magistracy represented a triumph for British interests 
at a time of intense rivalry between that country and France for the control 
of the Levant
24, and French apprehensions about Khūrī’s triumph were 
indeed justified for, as soon as he took office, he made clear his aim to lead 
Lebanon towards full independence, by amending the 1926 Constitution 
and eliminating the prerogatives it reserved for the mandatory authorities
25
. 
Khūrī was elected on the common Islamo-Christian platform 
represented by the Constitutional Bloc, which called for full Lebanese 
 
                                                 
23  Denise AMMOUN, Histoire du Liban Contemporain 1860-1943 (Paris: Fayard, 1997), p. 
440; Kamal S. SALIBI (History, p. 188) gives a different result: 44 votes in favour and 11 
abstentions. 
24  Charles WINSLOW, Lebanon. War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1996), pp. 78-79. 
25  C. WINSLOW, Lebanon, p. 79. 
Ecclesia triumphans? 
 
71 
independence and cooperation with the rest of the Arab world
26
. Such an 
arrangement, which was on the basis of the future National Pact, was read 
differently by Muslims and Christians
27
 but, as Kamal Salibi reminds, 
«neither side insisted on [their] point»
28
. The National Pact would be 
confirmed as a quasi-constitutional document, in spite of its oral character, 
by way of the Ministerial Declaration of October 7
th
, inaugurating an era of 
«virtual partnership in the running of the affairs of the state between [the] 
President [...] and [the] Prime Minister [...]»
29
. 
However, things were soon to get sour for, as soon as the National 
Assembly approved the bill of Constitutional Reform on November 8
th
 
1943 despite General de Gaulle’s opposition 30 , the High Commission 
proceeded to suspend the Fundamental Law, imprison President Khūrī and 
most of his Cabinet and appoint Imīl Iddih – the longtime ally of the French 
and paramount representative of the Maronist current which promoted the 
idea of a smaller, Christian-homogeneous Petit Liban
31
 in alliance with 
France or even the Zionist movement
32
 – as the new president. 
However, France’s move went wrong. The whole of Lebanon mobilized 
in support of their incarcerated leaders and refused to pay heed to Iddih’s 
Government, in spite of his popularity within the Maronite Community (in 
fact, the Maronite areas of Mount Lebanon had been the only area where 
Khūrī’s Constitutional Bloc did not win the legislative elections in the 
Summer of 1943), and supported the rump Government constituted by the 
two members of Khūrī’s Cabinet who had not been detained: Ḥabīb Abū 
 
                                                 
26  C. WINSLOW, Lebanon, p. 79. 
27  Farid EL-KHAZEN, The Communal Pact of National Identities. The Making and Politics 
of the 1943 National Pact (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1991), pp. 16-17. 
28  K. S. SALIBI, History, p. 187. 
29  F. TRABOULSI, Modern Lebanon, p. 110. 
30  C. WINSLOW, Lebanon, p. 79. 
31  Meir ZAMIR, “Émile Eddé and the Territorial Integrity of Lebanon”, Middle Eastern 
Studies 14 (1978), pp. 232-235. 
32  Stéphane MALSAGNE, Fouad Chéhab. Une figure oubliée de l‘Histoire libanaise (Paris– 
Beirut: Karthala and Presses de l’Ifpo, 2011), pp. 113-114; E. ZISSER, “Contacts”, pp. 
889-918. 
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Shahlā and Majīd Arslān. Even the Maronite Church, which had 
maintained an ambivalent position towards full independence, expressed its 
full support for the imprisoned Government
33
, joining the voices which 
called for complete independence and French withdrawal. Under strong 
British and American pressure – even threats34, the French finally gave in 
and released Khūrī and his Government on November 22nd, effectively 
putting an end to their Mandate over Lebanon. 
Free to rule without French interference (which would be definitely 
erased by the transfer of the Services d’Intérêts Communs35 on December 
23
rd
 1943 and the handover of the commandment of the Troupes Spéciales, 
on August 1
st
 1945, soon to become the embryo of the Lebanese Army), 
Khūrī and his partner in the fight for independence, Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, gave 
birth, as was advanced before, to the tradition of partnership at the helm of 
the State between the Maronite President and the Sunni Prime Minister, 
counterbalancing the constitutional omnipotence enjoyed by the President 
with the popular support that strong Sunni leaders like Ṣulḥ or Karāmī 
commanded among their correligionists
36 . Together, Khūrī and Ṣulḥ 
undertook the task of building the institutions of independent Lebanon and 
managed to do so with a considerable degree of success, particularly in the 
international arena, where Lebanon joined the UN as a founding member, 
 
                                                 
33  E. ZISSER, “Contacts”, p. 900. 
34  C. WINSLOW, Lebanon, p. 79. 
35  Denise AMMOUN describes these services as follows: «Les “services d’intérêts 
communs” comprennent un large éventail d’organismes dont la France, en sa qualité de 
mandataire, assurait jusque-là la direction pour le compte des gouvernements libanais 
et syrien. Il suffit de citer les douanes et la gestion des recettes douanières, les travaux 
publics, les PTT, les poudres et explosifs, la Sûreté générale, le contrôlle des sociétés 
concessionnaires et le séquestre des biens ennemis, le service relatif à la propriété 
industrielle, commerciale, littéraire et artistique, etc. Et, bien sûr, le commandement des 
Troupes Spéciales». (Histoire du Liban Contemporain 1943-1990 [Paris: Fayard, 2004], 
p. 19). 
36  Eyal ZISSER, “The Downfall of the Khuri Administration: A Dubious Revolution”, 
Middle Eastern Studies 16 (1994), p. 493; F. EL-KHAZEN, Breakdown (2000), pp. 241-
242. 
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at the same time that regional threats to the country’s independence were 
finally suffocated with the signing of the founding document of the Arab 
League, the Alexandria Protocol (October 7
th
 1944), whose article 4 
«emphasize[s the Arab States] respect of the independence and sovereignty 
of Lebanon in its present frontiers»
37
. 
In the internal scene, Khūrī’s mandate is considered the golden age of 
the “Merchant Republic”, an era of unbridled capitalism and economic 
flourishing, which Kamal Salibi defines as a time of «phenomenal 
prosperity»
38
. Long before the advent of oil money from the Gulf, Lebanon 
had already become an international trading center
39
, which was judiciously 
spending its wartime savings in the development of massive infrastructure 
projects, like the construction of a new airport. «In no time», Samir Khalaf 
reminds, «Beirut evolved into the main financial center of the Middle East 
and one of the leading centers in the world»
40
. The Lebanese economy 
benefited even from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which provided the country 
with a huge pool of unskilled and inexpensive labor, but also with the 
investments and training brought in by the Palestinian middle classes
41
 (one 
of them, Yūsif Baydas, popularly known as «monsieur cent milliards»42, 
founded what was to become Lebanon’s largest bank, the Intra, and also its 
biggest financial scandal, when the Bank collapsed in 1966). Moreover, the 
Arab boycott against Israel did also redound to the benefit of Beirut’s role 
as a trading center, for most firms settled in Palestine relocated to its 
northern neighbor. 
 
                                                 
37  The Avalon Project. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/alex.asp 
38  Kamal S. SALIBI, “Lebanon under Fuad Chehab 1958-1964”, Middle Eastern Studies 2 
(1966), pp. 214-215. 
39  Samir KHALAF, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon. A History of the 
Internationalization of Communal Conflict (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
2002), p. 160. 
40  S. KHALAF, Civil and Uncivil, p. 160. 
41  C. WINSLOW, Lebanon, p. 93. 
42  D. AMMOUN, Histoire II, p. 390. 
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However brilliant the macro-economic framework could seem, 
prosperity did not benefit all elements of the Lebanese society equally. In 
fact, the service-oriented economy was under the control of an extremely 
reduced number of families – mostly Christian 43 , known as “the 
consortium” which held «monopolistic control over the main axes of the 
country’s economy»44, including two-thirds of all foreign imports45, and 
around 40% of the GNP for 1948
46
. At the same time, lower-income strata, 
which represented about 78% of the total population, controlled less than a 
fourth of national income
47
. 
Together with such an unequal income distribution, Bishārah al-Khūrī’s 
mandate was also plagued by corruption and nepotism
48
, as well as by 
scandalous electoral fraud, both in the legislative elections of 1947 and 
1951, the former being vividly described by Denise Ammoun in the 
following terms: 
 
Dans certains villages, même les morts ont voté. Dans plusieurs villes, les 
fonctionnaires ont ajouté des urnes gonflées de bulletins factices, et le 
nombre de voix obtenues par le vainqueur a atteint le double, sinon le 
triple, de celui des électeurs inscrits [...] Parfois aussi [...] un candidat est 
élu sans avoir le nombre minimum de voix requises ...
49
 
 
The reasons behind such an electoral fraud stemmed not only from the 
President’s willingness to control the Legislative Chamber, but also from 
his desire to be reelected, in spite of the express constitutional provision 
 
                                                 
43  Fawwaz TRABOULSI (Modern Lebanon, p. 115) counts a total of 30 families, 24 
Christian and 6 Muslim. 
44  F. TRABOULSI, Modern Lebanon, p. 115. 
45  S. KHALAF, Civil and Uncivil, p. 163. 
46  F. TRABOULSI, Modern Lebanon, p. 117. 
47  B. LABAKI, “Chrétiens”, p. 172. 
48  George BRITT, “Lebanon’s Popular Revolution”, The Middle East Journal 7 (1953), pp. 
3-5; C. WINSLOW, Lebanon, pp. 95-96; E. ZISSER, “Downfall”, pp. 496-497; D. 
AMMOUN, Histoire II, p. 109. 
49  D. AMMOUN, Histoire II, p. 110. 
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preventing the President to serve more than one consecutive mandate. His 
goal achieved by the favorable vote of the National Assembly on May 22
nd
 
1947, this provoked, nonetheless, the apparition of a growing, nation-wide 
and inter-sectarian opposition
50
 to his rule, which was further fed by the 
economic discontent extended among the middle and lower classes
51
, and 
ended up by exploding after the legislative elections of 1951, which being 
cleaner than those of 1947
52
, gave the opposition more visibility. Moreover, 
the death of Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, killed in Amman on July 17th 1951, dealt a 
severe blow to Khūrī, who lost one of the mainstays of his power. The 
Sunni leader, whose prestige both among his coreligionists and around the 
Arab world, was intact, and his Maronite counterpart had been masters in 
«the art of Levantine patronage»
53
; without him and his ability «to control 
the Moslem populace in times of crisis»
54 , Khūrī started to find 
increasingly difficult to reshuffle the cabinet in order to ensure his 
permanence in power. 
Meanwhile, the Opposition was organized under a common platform 
calling for social and political reform
55
, which was variously labeled as the 
“Socialist Front” 56  or the “Patriotic Socialist Front” 57 , joining together 
figures as diverse as Kamīl Sham‘ūn, Kamāl Junblāṭ, the Iddi brothers or 
Pierre al-Jumayyil’s Katā’ib party58. Even higher Maronite prelates, not 
 
                                                 
50  E. ZISSER, “Downfall”, p. 497. 
51  G. BRITT, “Revolution”, pp. 4, 8-9; F. Traboulsi, Modern Lebanon, p. 124. 
52  C. WINSLOW, Lebanon, p. 96. 
53  C. WINSLOW, Lebanon, p. 82. 
54  K. S. SALIBI, History, p. 195. 
55  F. TRABOULSI, Modern Lebanon, p. 125. 
56  G. BRITT, “Revolution”, p. 11; C. Winslow, Lebanon, p. 96. 
57  F. TRABOULSI, Modern Lebanon, p. 125. 
58  Founded in 1936 «as a paramilitary youth movement» (Frank STOAKES, “The 
Supervigilantes: The Lebanese Kataeb Party as a Builder, Surrogate and Defender of the 
State”, Middle Eastern Studies 11 [1975], p. 215), the Lebanese Katā’ib Party evolved 
into one of the biggest mass parties of the Arab world. Inspired by Maronite nationalism 
in its origins, the party evolved towards more moderate positions before the Civil War 
(J. P. ENTELIS, “Belief-System”, p. 151), but always with the aim of building a strong 
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least among them, the Patriarch himself
59
 and the Archbishop of Beirut, 
Mgr. Mubārak60 , joined the choir of voices demanding the President’s 
resignation. 
Khūrī’s last attempts at reform did not manage to convince anyone61, 
despite his nomination of prestigious members of the Sunni Community to 
the Premiership, like Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ and ‘Abdallah al-Yāfī. Not even Khūrī’s 
sacrifice of his unpopular brother Salīm, in the Summer of 1952, by forcing 
him to resign from his responsibilities in the Police and the Gendarmerie
62
, 
managed to calm down the popular reaction that, by then, had already set 
Lebanon on fire, with a wave of strikes that paralyzed the country
63
, and the 
huge Opposition rally in Dayr al-Qamar (August 17
th
 1952), which 
gathered over forty thousand people calling for the President’s 
resignation
64
. Unable to recompose the governmental coalition, without 
army support
65
 nor any possible ally to turn to, Bishārah al-Khūrī resigned 
on September 18
th
 1952, leaving General Shihāb as provissional Head of 
Government until the election of a new President. 
 
 
2.2. ‘The Revolt of the Pashas’ or the 1958 Crisis 
 
On September 23
rd
 1952, less than a week after Bishārah al-Khūrī’s 
resignation, the National Assembly elected Kamīl Sham‘ūn as the second 
President of independent Lebanon. In his nomination speech, the President 
«promised to fight corruption, talked about the ‘modesty and ascetism’ of 
the president’s post and promised to abolish the privileges and formalities 
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attached to it»
66
, and in consonance with the platform of the anti-Khūrī 
Opposition, he also promised to foster a reformist agenda to end the abuses 
that had characterized the former Administration
67
. This initial reformist 
impulse, embodied by Khālid Shihāb’s “Cabinet of Decrees”, manifested 
itself in a number of far-reaching reforms affecting both the public and the 
private sectors
68
 (including granting voting rights to women, or establishing 
civil service examinations). However, the precarious alliance that had 
brought Sham‘ūn to power started soon to decompose, due to its members’ 
different positions on the extent of such reforms
69
, and the President started 
to rely on the Consortium and on President Khūrī’s former allies in the 
Constitutional Bloc
70
. 
Sham‘ūn’s halfhearted reforms71 were not enough to alter the socio-
economic foundations of the Republic, which continued maintaining a 
laissez-faire outlook excluding most of the population from the benefits of 
an economic growth which continued unabated, in spite of the political 
turmoil affecting both the country and the region
72
. The passing of a 
banking secrecy law, in 1957, the growing gold coverage of the Lebanese 
pound (which attained a 95% by the end of 1955
73
) and the arrival of Arab 
capitals fleeing from the nationalizing policies then en vogue in most 
Middle East countries, only served to consolidate the country’s outward-
looking, service-oriented economic outlook. 
However, Sham‘ūn’s presidency is best remembered for the exorbitant 
role Lebanon came to play in Middle East politics
74 . The president’s 
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impeccable Pan-Arab credentials
75
 led him to pose as a mediator between 
conflicting Arab States
76
, and so he tried to broker a settlement between the 
Iraqi Hashemites and Saudi Arabia’s royal family77 and, later on, between 
Egypt and Iraq
78. However, the international scene Sham‘ūn had to deal 
with was not the same as that of Khūrī and Ṣulḥ’s era, for the old 
nationalist politics of the independence age, with its foreign-educated, 
liberal-prone hommes politiques, was about to set, to be substituted by a 
new epoch, wherein the charismatic leaderships of strongmen, like Nāṣir, 
was to alter forever the face of Middle East politics. 
Fearing the influence that the Egyptian president came to exert on 
Lebanon’s Muslims 79 , Sham‘ūn started to shift away from Lebanon’s 
traditional neutralist position and to rely more intensely on the West, 
especially on Great Britain and the United States
80
. 
The signature, on January 13
th
 1955 of the British-sponsored Baghdad 
Pact, by Iraq and Turkey, not only provoked «violent student and popular 
demonstrations across Lebanon»
81
, but also, and more importantly, excited 
inter-Arab passions beyond reason as Nāṣir triggered a vicious media 
campaign against his Iraqi counterparts
82. Despite Lebanon’s attempt at 
mediation during the Arab League Cairo Conference
83
 (January 22
nd
 1955), 
Iraq ratified the Pact in February, and Nasser responded by signing a Pact 
with Saudi Arabia and Syria (known as the “Arab Defence Pact”), which 
specifically refused any alliance with a non-Arab power, and called for a 
closer cooperation between those countries. 
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Even though Sham‘ūn refused to join either of the Pacts, in spite of 
strong pressure coming from both sides
84
, he appeared to support the anti-
communist Treaty when, in the midst of the Iraqi-Egyptian storm, he 
visited Turkey (March 1955) where he signed a number of cooperation 
agreements with the Turkish leader, Adnan Menderes, and both presidents 
proclaimed «the identity of views and policies of the two countries»
85
, thus 
linking Lebanon, to a certain extent, to the Baghdad Pact. The visit, widely 
considered a diplomatic faux pas even by staunch Westernists, like the 
owner and editor of L’Orient, Georges Naccache 86 , compromised 
Lebanon’s position in the Arab world and eroded Sham‘ūn’s popularity 
among his country’s Muslim population, which was to be further 
undermined by the country’s reaction to the Suez Crisis. 
The Suez War, triggered after Nāṣir’s Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal 
on July 26
th
 1956, had the double effect of polarizing even further inter-
Arab rivalries and elevating Nasser to quasi-divine stature among the Arab 
masses, putting Sham‘ūn on the difficult position of having to choose 
between the growing wave of Nāṣir-sponsored Arab nationalism and his 
own Western-oriented Lebanism
87
. In order to avoid taking sides, the 
Lebanese President convened an Arab League meeting in Beirut, on 
November 1956, which severely condemned the tripartite (French, British 
and Israeli) aggression against Egypt and resolved to break off relations 
with both European powers. Sham‘ūn, however, refused to do so88 – like 
Jordan and Iraq which maintained their diplomatic relations with the United 
Kingdom
89
 – arguing that «it was more advantageous for the Arabs to 
maintain direct relations with the West, particularly during a crisis, rather 
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than have to resort to third party mediators»
90
. However, and in spite of the 
apparent success of the conference
91, Sham‘ūn’s reasons for not breaking 
relations with France and Great Britain did not manage to convince neither 
a large part of the Lebanese public, including Sunni ministers Salām and 
Yāfī, who resigned in protest92, nor the Egyptian president, who affirmed 
that «the rulers of Lebanon stabbed us in the back during our time of stress, 
at the time when Britain, France and Israel were attacking us»
93
, and began 
an intense propaganda war against the Lebanese president via his foremost 
tool: the radio broadcaster “The Voice of the Arabs”. 
The international situation became even more complex with the 
announcement made by US President Eisenhower on January 5
th
 1957, of 
the new American policy guidelines for the Middle East (unsurprisingly, 
the principles became known as the “Eisenhower Doctrine”). The 
Doctrine’s purpose was, according to the President’s speech, to «preserve 
the integrity and independence of nations of the Middle East [...] against 
armed aggression from any country controlled by International 
Communism»
94
, committing American assistance whenever it would be 
necessary to avoid such an outcome. The Lebanese acceptance of the 
Doctrine, formally subscribed on March 14
th
 1957, had to do with 
Sham‘ūn’s perception of Nāṣir as a threat for Lebanese independence as 
well as his belief that «only close cooperation with the western powers 
could guarantee [the country’s] national security»95. The establishment of 
the United Arab Republic (joining Egypt and Syria in a unitary Republic 
under Nasser’s leadership) only served to confirm Sham‘ūn’s fears, for as 
soon as it was created, throngs of Lebanese poured into the road of 
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Damascus to greet the Egyptian ra’īs96, while at the same time, violent 
demonstrations hailing Nāṣir and demanding the incorporation of Lebanon 
to the UAR
97
 (the mob chanted: «al-sha’b al-lubnani al-tha’ir badduh al-
wihdah ‘ajil ‘ajil [meaning] The Lebanese people in revolt want the union 
right away!»
98
) took place throughout the country. 
Meanwhile, in the internal arena, the growing polarization of the public 
opinion regarding the external allegiances of the Lebanese Republic was 
further exacerbated by the Government’s apparent intention to secure 
Sham‘ūn’s reelection99  by amending the electoral law. The bill, finally 
enacted as law in April 1957, and presented as a victory over political 
feudalism
100
, increased the number of seats from 44 to 66, while at the 
same time reduced the number of electoral districts from 33 to 27. Whether 
gerrymandering was the Executive’s true intention or not, the electoral 
results gave an overwhelming victory for Sham‘ūn’s supporters, who 
managed to secure 58 seats in the Assembly. Samir Khalaf reminds how 
«[v]irtually all the veteran politicians and prominent leaders of the 
opposition [...] were displaced in favour of pro-government candidates»
101
, 
which precipitated the organization of the – mostly Muslim – opposition 
under a common umbrella, soon to be known as National Union Front, 
calling for «cooperation with the Arab states; rejection of military aid 
which compromised Lebanese neutrality; and opposition to a constitutional 
amendment that would allow [Sham‘ūn] to seek re-election»102. 
However, Sham‘ūn’s policies did not only manage to alienate the 
Muslim street – by opposing Nāṣirism – and the Muslim élites – by 
preventing their election to the Assembly in 1957 – but also divided the 
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Christian ranks
103
, with several relevant leaders, like Raymūn Iddih, Hanrī 
Fir‘aūn, Shāril Ḥilū and Jurj Naqqāsh, creating an alternative force to the 
Opposition and the Government that became known, perhaps not very 
originally, as the “Third Force”. The Third Force opposed Sham‘ūn’s 
reelection
104
 and called for «a return to Lebanon’s traditional neutralist 
foreign policy»
105
. 
Even more important than the existence of the Third Force was the 
position of the Maronite Patriarch (who was to become the first Maronite 
Cardinal in 1965), Mgr. Ma‘ūshī, who had acceded to the Patriarchal throne 
in 1955. From the beginning of his reign, the Patriarch maintained a warm 
approach to Arab Nationalism, for he «believed that support for Arab 
causes was an effective means to maintain the loyalty of the Lebanese 
Muslims for the Republic»
106
, and consequently opposed both the Baghdad 
Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. Ma‘ūshī’s stance not only earned him 
the appreciation of the Egyptian leadership
107, but also that of Lebanon’s 
Muslim population
108 . However, Ma‘ūshī’s political position was not 
shared by all in the Maronite hierarchy; in fact, most of the lower clergy 
supported the presidential stand, with 
 
funeral bells [being] tolled in Deir el-Qamar [...] in protest to an [...] 
statement by the patriarch that ‘the Maronites were a drop in the sea of 
Muslims and must therefore support Muslim Arab Nationalism or pack up 
and leave
109
. 
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The Maronite League, a lay organization of Maronite notables, went as far 
as to present a formal complaint to Pope Pius XII protesting against the 
Patriarch’s political activities110, and a number of bishops followed on the 
steps of the League by cabling the Holy See to criticize his stance during 
the crisis
111
. Nonetheless, the Vatican remained silent preferring not to 
interfere within the internal affairs of the Maronite Church
112
. 
In this tense atmosphere, the murder, on May 8
th
 1958, of Nasīb al-
Matnī, owner of the opposition journal Al-Teleghraf, served as a pretext for 
the beginning of hostilities between the Opposition and the Government. 
For the following two months, both parties strove for the control of the 
country, though the fighting reached different levels of intensity, depending 
on the area – with the Shūf, Beirut and Tripoli being particularly affected113 
– and normal life continued with just minimal disruptions (e.g.: in Beirut, 
fighting normally «took place in the afternoons and at night, also in several 
instances over the weekend»
114
). 
In order to put an end to the conflict, and given the fact that the 
Opposition was receiving arms smuggled from the Syrian province of the 
UAR
115, the Lebanese Government, which feared a coup d’état, requested 
US intervention
116
 and presented an official complaint against the UAR 
before the United Nations
117
. However, none of these requests bear fruit 
until the Iraqi Revolution of July 14
th
, which threatening to knock down the 
entire web of American alliances in the Middle East, triggered a 
coordinated Anglo-American operation to protect both the Lebanese and 
the Jordanian regimes, the remaining Arab Allies of the West in the region. 
 
                                                 
110  C. ATTIE, Struggle, p. 215 
111  S. E. BAROUDI, “Perspectives”, p. 23. 
112  S. E. BAROUDI, “Perspectives”, pp. 22-23. 
113  A. HOTTINGER, “Zu‘ama”, pp. 132-134. 
114  A. HOTTINGER, “Zu‘ama”, p. 132. 
115  S. KHALAF, Civil and Uncivil, pp. 115-116; C. ATTIÉ, Struggle, p. 218. 
116  F. TRABOULSI, Modern Lebanon, p. 134. 
117  D. AMMOUN, Histoire II, p. 256. 
Borja W. González Fernández 
 
84 
Despite the initial tension between American and Lebanese troops
118
, 
the US intervention paved the way for a solution to the crisis, leading to 
presidential elections on July 31
st
, which brought a neutral and respected 
figure, the commander of the Army, General Shihāb to the presidency. The 
General’s election «brought about a perceptible relaxation in the level of 
hostility»
119, although Sham‘ūn, who insisted in serving his full term120, did 
not step down until September 23
rd. Thereafter, Shihāb assumed the 
presidential powers and entrusted Rashīd Karāmī, one of the leaders of the 
insurrection in Tripoli, with the task of forming a new government, which 
he duly did presenting a cabinet fully composed of sympathizers of the 
rebellion, to the exclusion of the former majority. His subsequent 
declaration, that the Cabinet had come to “harvest the fruits of 
revolution”121, as well as the kidnapping and murder of Fu’ād Haddād, 
editor of al-Amal, the official press organ of the Katā’ib, led to a violent 
wave of protests, a true «counterrevolution»
122
 affecting mainly the 
Christian areas
123
, which did not cease until October 14
th
 when a new, four-
man cabinet was formed, including an equal number of representatives 
from both sides, under a formula which was soon to become famous: la 
ghālib wa la maghlūb (“no victor and no vanquished”). 
 
 
2.3. The 1970 Elections 
 
If the presidencies of Khūrī and Sham‘ūn had been the golden age of 
laissez-faire, an era of unrestricted economic liberalism and prodigious 
economic growth, Fu’ād Shihāb and his heir in the Presidency, Shāril Ḥilū, 
are remembered for their Keynesian economic orientation (more 
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pronounced in the case of the General
124
) and their attempt «to introduce 
comprehensive reforms in [Lebanon’s] political and administrative 
system». Both presidents achieved an immense success in reducing the 
inequalities that had plagued the country, so that by 1974 the middle class 
represented two-thirds of the population
125. However, the rule of Shihāb 
had also its dark side, for the development of socio-economic projects 
could not mask the growing influence of the Military Intelligence Service, 
known as the Deuxième Bureau, which overstepped its mission to control 
the country’s external and internal security 126 , becoming an authentic 
political police that «interfered in domestic political life, the administration, 
legislative and municipal elections, distributed licences for carrying 
firearms and engaged in arbitrary arrests»
127
. 
On the eve of the 1970 presidential elections, the country was facing 
several challenges to its very survival, in spite of the economic prosperity it 
still enjoyed (although the Intra Bank crash had dealt a harsh blow to the 
international prestige of the Lebanese financial system
128
), the gravest of 
them being the armed presence of Palestinian guerrillas, whose attacks 
against Israel from Southern Lebanon triggered Israeli retaliations which 
struck vital infrastructures (like the bombing of Beirut Airport on 
December 28
th
 1968). The Palestinian presence became rapidly an 
extremely divisive issue in Lebanese political life, for, whereas most 
Muslims supported it and demanded the government to «give a free hand to 
Palestinian organization»
129
, a majority of Christians feared that the 
guerrillas were being used as a tool «to subvert the Lebanese system»
130
. 
The signature of the Cairo Agreement, on November 8
th
 1969, giving legal 
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recognition to the presence of armed fidā’ī-s on Lebanese territory 131 , 
aroused even further the already existing Christian fears of a Palestinian 
takeover of Lebanon. 
By then, the main leaders of the Christian community: Kamīl Sham‘ūn, 
Raymūn Iddih and Pierre al-Jumayyil had already formed an alliance (the 
Triple Alliance, more known under its name in Arabic: al-Ḥilf al-thulāthi, 
henceforth the Ḥilf) rallying together against what they perceived as «the 
increasing threat from the Palestinians and radical forces in Lebanon»
132
. 
The new coalition profited from the thirst for a change that existed in the 
population after more than a decade of Shihābist rule133 and, together with 
the Central Bloc, score a victory over the establishment candidates in the 
1968 legislative elections. However small – only one seat – might have 
been the difference between the Ḥilf and the Nahj (as were known the 
Shihāabist deputies), the Ḥilf won by landslide in Mount Lebanon 134 , 
revealing thus the growing opposition of the Christian communities to the 
continuation of Shihābism, which many of them regarded as «a threat to 
their own positions and to the Christian character of Lebanon»
135
. 
Knowing how difficult it would be to elect a president of their choice 
with both blocs in the Assembly commanding an almost equal number of 
MPs, relevant members of the Nahj pressured General Shihāb to run as 
candidate for another mandate, which was constitutionally possible, as six 
years had passed since he had left the Presidency. Even though Shihāb 
toyed with the idea of making a comeback, he finally dropped it, not only 
because his candidacy was opposed by most Maronite leaders, including 
the Patriarch
136
, but also because he could not obtain the unanimous 
support of the Muslim leaders for his plan to military cripple the Palestinian 
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guerillas
137
. The General expressed clearly the reasons for his refusal when 
he said: 
 
Les libanais attendent de mon action beaucoup plus qu’ils en réclameraient 
à un autre président et je ne peux pas faire de miracles. Si je suis élu, les 
libanais et les hommes politiques jugeront leur mission terminée, ils diront 
qu’il incombe à Chéhab de résoudre le problème. Par la suite, si l’on voit 
un seul fedaï en tenue de combat place des Canons, et cela ne manquera 
pas de se produire, le problème reviendra à son point de départ. La 
réputation de Chéhab en souffrira. Les solutions magiques n’existent 
pas
138
. 
 
With Shihāb out of the scene, the Nahj rushed to select a candidate, and the 
choice finally fell on Ilyās Sarkīs, Shihāb’s appointee 139 . An efficient 
administrator, who had served as director of the National Bank, Sarkīs, who 
lacked a political base of his own
140
, was nonetheless a much weaker 
candidate than the former President, being opposed even by a significant 
section of the Nahj
141
. On the Opposition side, the three leaders of the Ḥilf, 
coveted the presidency, but being unable to muster all the votes required to 
reach their goal, they decided to block Sarkīs’ candidacy by supporting a 
consensus candidate
142
. The designation of such a candidate was not to be, 
however, an easy task, and it was not until twenty four hours before the 
electoral séance
143
 that the coalition agreed on a candidate: Sulaymān 
Faranjiyyah. 
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The choice of Faranjiyyah, a Mountain za‘īm from Northern Lebanon, 
who had been involved in the infamous Tuerie de Mizyārah144, responded 
to his appearance as a strong man, who would be able to impose his 
authority over the country after Ḥilū’s weak presidency145. Moreover, his 
opposition to Sham‘ūn during the 1958 uprising, as well as his belonging to 
a political coalition (the “Central Bloc”, also known by its name in Arabic 
as al-Wasaṭ) whose other leaders were Muslims (the Sunni Ṣā’ib Salām and 
the Shiite Kāmil el-As‘ad), made him appear as «a Maronite notable who 
[did] not [confine] his loyalties to the Christian community»
146
. 
Faranjiyyah was, thus, the perfect consensus candidate. 
The election took place on August 17
th
 1970 and was a hectic event. 
Three ballots were needed before the President was finally chosen, and 
even then, Faranjiyyah was elected by only a vote of difference over Sarkīs. 
Paradoxically, a man so representative of the feudal class ascended to the 
presidency thanks to the votes of a man who wanted to completely modify 
the Lebanese system
147: Kamāl Junblāṭ, who, together with three other 
members of his group
148
, voted for Faranjiyyah, giving him thus the 
necessary advantage to win the election. 
Faranjiyyah’s election was a fateful choice. Lacking ability and tact, the 
new President was soon unable, in spite of a promising beginning with the 
appointment of a Youth Cabinet under the leadership of his partner Ṣā’ib 
Salām 149, to control the situation of a country suffering of serious internal 
and international problems. Focused on hoarding power by stretching to the 
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limit the wide constitutional faculties of the President, he alienated the 
whole Sunni establishment. With the positions on both sides of the political 
divide progressively radicalized, the war seemed inevitable. 
 
 
3. Analysis 
 
When, after fifteen years of Civil War, the remnants of the Lebanese 
Parliament met in Saudi city of Ṭā’if to reach a peace agreement, the 
participating deputies addressed what was widely believed to be Lebanon’s 
foremost problem: that of confessionalism and sectarian imbalance. 
Therefore, presidential powers were severely curtailed to the benefit of the 
Sunni Prime Minister, and confessionalism was mostly abolished 
throughout the Administration
150
 (except at the level of Director-General). 
Moreover, Lebanon’s identity was constitutionally defined as “Arab” and 
the country was put under Syrian overlordship
151
. However, when a quarter 
of century has passed since the ratification of the Agreement, Lebanon 
remains a hotspot in the Middle East; sectarian infighting, administrative 
corruption and financial misdemeanors have been plaguing the country 
ever since, making its Second Republic (1943-1975) appear as a cherished 
memory of an era of economic growth and inter-religious harmony. 
How is it possible, then, that if confessionalism and “Maronite primacy” 
were the main reasons behind the war’s outbreak, its collapse has not 
brought peace and stability? The answer is obvious, because neither 
Maronite “hegemony” existed nor confessionalism was the main engine 
driving the Lebanese political machine. Beginning by the latter, it is 
obvious that Lebanon was a State organized under confessional lines, for 
positions in its political and administrative apparatuses were distributed 
following sectarian criteria, however, «guaranteeing equity and amity by a 
 
                                                 
150  F. TRABOULSI, Modern Lebanon, p. 244. 
151  B. LABAKI, “Chrétiens”, p. 110. 
Borja W. González Fernández 
 
90 
proportional representation of the different confessional groups»
152
 not only 
did not prevent the formation of inter-sectarian groupings, but even worked 
to «[ensure] that electoral alliances and programmes [cut] across communal 
divisions»
153
, as deputies represented the whole nation and not only their 
sect. 
The examples provided above underline this trans-communalism of 
Lebanese politics, as in the three studied periods, alliances crossed 
confessional boundaries and were forged over ideological, economic or 
social interests. In 1952, opposition to Bishārah al-Khūrī’s corrupt regime 
came from both sides of the religious divide, and its main leaders, making 
an intelligent use of the media to mobilize a dissatisfied power opinion 
against the Government
154
, joined together in an ad-hoc political 
movement, the Socialist Front, to overthrow a President whose growing 
accumulation of power threatened their position in the political game
155
. 
The “Revolt of the Pashas”, in 1958, followed a similar scheme of wide 
élite resistance against a President determined to reinforce his power over 
other powerful political brokers (first, with the 1957 electoral reform which 
excluded most za‘īm-s from the Assembly, and later with Sham‘ūn’s 
willingness to amend the Constitution to ensure his reelection), who rapidly 
constituted an expedient and temporary political umbrella to advance their 
goals, the National Union Front, which despite all its Pan-Arabist rhetoric, 
did not have a true desire of breaking Lebanon’s ties with the West156. The 
establishment of the Third Force, including many Christian leaders, 
underlined that Opposition to Sham‘ūn was not based mainly based neither 
on his Western affiliation nor on his liberalism, but on what was perceived 
as his breaking the rules governing balance of power in Lebanon. 
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The 1970 elections constitute maybe an even better example of this 
inter-sectarian élite cooperation, as Shihāb’s reelection was opposed not 
only by the mainly Christian Ḥilf, but also by wide sections of the Muslim 
establishment
157, and Faranjiyyah’s election under the banner of the Islamo-
Christian Wasaṭ alliance, was only possible thanks to the votes of Kāmal 
Junblāṭ’s Progressive Socialist Party, who legitimately maneuvered within 
the system to advance his own political goals
158
. 
These examples prove sufficiently the lack of basis of those 
explanations arguing for the primacy of sectarianism over other ties in 
Lebanon, and gives credence to Oren Barak’s assertion about the primacy 
of the intra-sectarian aspect over the inter-sectarian, for that country is 
characterized by its «“pluralism within pluralism” [meaning that there 
exists a] pronounced internal diversity within each of its communities»
159
, 
to the point that inter-sectarian alliances are very often needed to counter 
intra-sectarian feuds
160
. Instead of sectarianism, the two elements that 
dominated political life in Lebanon during the studied period were kinship 
and za‘īm-ship. 
Samir Khalaf defines kinship as «Lebanon’s most solid and enduring 
tie»
161
 and as an almost sovereign institution, acting as the individual’s 
«exclusive agency of political socialization and tutelage»
162
. The 
importance of blood relations is underlined not only by the fact that 
Lebanese politics during the period examined in this essay were the 
preserve of a reduced number of families (Iddih, Salām, Karāmī, Junblāṭ), 
who compete furiously for parliamentary and governmental appointments, 
but also by the fact that an individual’s stand in the social and political 
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scale was mostly defined in terms of his ancestry
163
 (the resistance of 
Rashīd Karāmī to the appointment of Ilyās Sarkīs as Nahjī candidate in 
1970 had to do with the latter’s lack of pedigree164). Episodes of intra-
sectarian violence like the Tuerie de Mizyārah, or the infighting between 
the Tripolitan Karāmī and Munla families in the 1940s, stand as good 
witnesses of the fierce competition between different families belonging to 
the same confessional group. 
Rooted in the feudal traditions of the iqṭā‘ system165, za‘īm-ship refers 
to the quasi-feudal, or even Roman-like
166
, relation linking «a political 
leader [to a] locally circumscribed community»
167
, involving a kind of do 
ut des compromise whereby, in exchange for the support of his clientele or 
zilm, the za‘īm had a duty to provide them with services168. Although most 
za‘īm-s belonged to the same confessional community as their zilm, the 
patron-client relation was not based on sectarian allegiance (in fact, in 
confessionally-mixed areas, the za‘īm-s actively sook to gather a following 
belonging to all the religious groups
169
), but on their reciprocal utilitarian 
obligations
170
. Within the za‘īm system, competition had mostly an intra-
sectarian character as, frequently more than one za‘īm fought for the 
control of the same territory and used to present their feudal quarrels under 
a political colouring (Junblāṭ and Arslān in the Shūf, Faranjiyyah and 
Duwayhī in Zghartā or Skāf and Abū Khāṭir in Zaḥlah). 
 
                                                 
163  S. KHALAF, “Primordial”, p. 246. 
164  D. AMMOUN, Histoire II, p. 459. 
165  Nizar A. HAMZEH, “Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends”, Middle Eastern Studies 
37 (2001), pp. 167-169. 
166  Vid. Jérôme CARCOPINO, La Vida Cotidiana en Roma en el Apogeo del Imperio, 
translated from French by Mercedes Fernández Cuesta (Barcelona: Círculo de Lectores, 
1994), pp. 207-208. 
167  C. E. A. KNIGHT, “Traditional Influences”, p. 334. 
168  N. A. HAMZEH, “Clientalism”, p. 172. 
169  Peter GUBSER, “The Zu‘ama of Zahlah: The Current Situation in a Lebanese Town”, The 
Middle East Journal 27 (1973), p. 175. 
170  N. A. HAMZEH, “Clientalism”, p. 172. 
Ecclesia triumphans? 
 
93 
Contrary to the opinion of Nizar Hamzeh or Michael Hudson, the 
persistence of these traditional ties did not make the Lebanese system 
neither innately weak
171
 nor unable to modernize
172
. Had it been so, it is 
unexplainable why Lebanon’s score on almost all indicators of political and 
social development was much better than those of other Third World 
countries whose political systems were organized alongside more “modern” 
lines
173
. On the contrary, as Samir Khalaf states, it was precisely the 
persistence of such traditional bonds that led the way to a specifically 
Lebanese approach to modernity, based on adaptation and assimilation, not 
swift transformation
174
, that could have persisted and reached new heights 
had it not been for the external pressures the system had to deal with from 
1967 onwards, which overwhelmed its capabilities to withstand change and 
prevented the continuation of its natural development. 
On the question of Maronite primacy, it is important to examine the 
figure of the President, who was – and still is – always a member of that 
Church. Taking into account the dispositions of the 1926 Constitution, the 
Lebanese President could be defined as an «autocrat»
175
, an heir to French 
colonialism
176
 or even a corporal incarnation of the State
177
. However, and 
in spite of the express provisions of the Fundamental Law, it is important to 
take into account that Constitutional Law goes well beyond “Law on the 
books” to cover customs and practices whose importance often equals that 
of written Law. In the Lebanese case, the National Pact not only was 
intended to provide for the distribution of official positions under a 
sectarian formula, it also established a power-sharing agreement between 
the President and the Prime Minister, whereby the President had to restrain 
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his power to become something akin to an arbiter, in the words of Professor 
Hourani: 
 
it [was] expected that he [the President] should stand above the 
communities, that his authority should be secular, that he should express 
the unity of the state [and] to cut across the network of sectarian interests, 
and make necessary decisions in the light of the national interest
178
. 
 
Whenever the President forsook his arbitral role to push for his own 
interests, disturbing thereby the balance and compromise that characterized 
Lebanon’s politics179, the political equilibrium has been severely perturbed, 
as happened in 1952 and 1958. When Khūr and Sham‘ūn’s actions went 
well beyond the accepted consensus, the response of the political élite was 
to block their action until they were forced to back out. The reverse was 
also true, for in the late 1970’s Faranjiyyah refused to cooperate with his 
arch-rival Rashīd Karāmī, whom he had had to appoint as Premier in a 
desperate attempt to quell the violence which was extending throughout the 
country, and thus crippled the Cabinet’s ability to enforce its authority. It 
can therefore be said that the system worked under a double-veto 
arrangement which effectively limited the wide Constitutional powers of 
the President. 
The alleged supremacy of the Maronite community is also questionable 
when the internal divisions affecting the Church and its members are taken 
into account. For almost a century, between the 1820s and the inception of 
the French Mandate, the Church, having gotten rid of the influence of the 
Maronite feudal lords (mainly of the Khāzin family), became the dominant 
influence in the Mountain
180
, and her Patriarchs the principal spokesmen 
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for the community. The accession of powerful figures,
181
 like Būlus 
Mas‘ad, Yūḥanā al-Ḥāj or Ilyās al-Ḥuwayyik, to the Patriarchal throne only 
served to confirm this empowerment of the Church which came to its 
zenith with the travel of Mgr. Ḥuwayyik to the Paris Peace Conference 
where he presided one of the Lebanese Delegations, demanding the 
independence of the country and the extension of its borders
182
. However, 
as soon as the Lebanese Delegation’s goals were achieved, the leading role 
in the community passed from the Patriarch to the politicians, and thus the 
unity of the community under a common project was broken. Iddih and 
Khūrī, under the French Mandate, represented the first of the long series of 
intra-Maronite quarrels that plagued the History of independent Lebanon. 
Given the chasm dividing most Maronite leaders, their quest for 
political prominence had to deal on the support of other confessional 
groups. As has been seen throughout this essay, both Khūrī and Sham‘ūn 
acceded to the presidency thanks to the support of most Muslim leaders and 
both Presidents kept their position by building a preferential alliance with a 
prominent member of the Sunni community
183
, and in spite of the 
opposition of the Maronite Patriarch (Mgr. Arīḍah during Khūrī’s tenure 
and Mgr. Ma‘ūshī during Sham‘ūn’s presidency) to their respective 
political orientation
184
.  
The influence of the Maronite political élite was thus limited and, in 
fact, the community’s apparent advantage in the educative and professional 
arenas over her Muslim counterparts was progressively eroded during the 
Republic as more Muslims started receiving a formalized education
185
 and 
acceding the professional sectors of the economy
186
. By 1975, the 
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Maronites were just another community within the Lebanese mosaic-like 
sectarian framework 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
On March 10
th
 1949, the editor-in-chief and owner of the daily L’Orient, 
Georges Naccache published an editorial which was to become famous and 
to put him in jail. Deux négations ne font pas une nation expressed a 
considerable distrust towards that gentleman’s agreement between Bishārah 
al-Khūrī and Riyād al-Ṣulḥ, which was to be known as the “National Pact”. 
«À la force de ne vouloir ni l’Ouest ni l’Est [...] nos dirigeants ont fini par 
nous faire perdre le nord»
187
 deplored Mr. Naccache in his article, but 
despite all his mistrust towards the agreement, it managed to give Lebanon 
over thirty years of prosperity, only briefly broken twice until the definitive 
disruption of civil life in 1975. 
In this essay, we have tried to prove that the era inaugurated by the 
National Pact witnessed an unrivaled trend of political and social moderniz-
ation, reducing the gaps between the different sectarian and regional groups 
the Lebanese society is composed of, and generating a level of personal and 
political freedom without comparison in the Middle East. The fact that this 
trend took place while traditional ties continued commanding the loyalty of 
wide sections of the population cannot, in any case, overshadow the merit 
of the progress achieved between 1943 and 1975. In fact, the compatibility 
between the persistence of traditional bonds and progress serves to destroy 
those radical approaches that only conceive of modernization within a 
Western-like framework based on individualism and secularization. 
Our approach to the evolution of Lebanon during its Second Republic 
has also permitted us to realize how confessionalism was not the main 
factor driving that country’s politics, but only one more amongst other ties. 
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We have actually tried to prove how political tension used to have more an 
intra-communal than an inter-communal character, while at the same time, 
alliances and cooperation extended well beyond sectarian boundaries, 
defying thus, the «essentialism [of those authors who conceive] of ethnic 
groups as rigid, homogeneous, and unchanging entities»
188
. 
The study of confessionalism that has been undertaken throughout these 
pages has had the Maronite Church as its main character. Thereby it has 
been tried to pay a modest contribution to an area of scholarship utterly 
deserted by the Academia, despite the fact that the Maronite Church is not 
only the only Christian compact minority in the Middle East, but also one 
of the few of such communities conceiving of herself as nation. By 
focusing on this Church, we have also aspired to overcome the prejudices 
which defined her as a dominant, hegemonic or even racially prejudiced 
community
189
, and I believe that our goals have been reached, for it has 
been sufficiently proved that the Maronites participated as equal partners in 
a power-sharing agreement with all other Lebanese communities, and were 
far from being a solid, united bloc, suffering instead from profound internal 
divisions which forced the different sectors of the community to build 
trans-sectarian alliances in order to reach their political goals. Under the 
Second Republic, the Maronite Church was not, in spite of all appearances, 
a Ecclesia Triumphans. 
At present, in a time of growing exacerbation of sectarian animosities 
throughout the Middle East, and with Lebanon lacking a President for over 
two months, maybe it would be useful to remember the spirit of the 
National Pact, whose “live and let live” philosophy managed to propel 
Lebanon to its golden age. 
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